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1.  Introduction 
Reproductive health care services, such as abortion and 
contraception, are the subject  of a long -running and heated 
debate in biomedical ethics and health policy worldwide. On one 
side of the debate, those opposed to contraception and abortion 
liken their use to murder, and argue that  the state should neither 
support  such immoral actions, nor require objectors to 
participate in their provision. In response, advocates of rights to 
contraception and abortion argue that they are essential health 
services, access to which is necessary for the enjoyment of 
fundamental freedoms, health, and reproductive autonomy.  
In this paper we examine the ongoing debate surrounding the 
rights of health care professionals to object  to professional 
duties which conflict with the ir personal beliefs  –  with 
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particular reference to services which promote reproductive 
autonomy, such as abortion and contracept ion1.  In doing so, we 
draw attention to a worrying trend in health care policy. To 
examine this trend we consider examples of a tendency in Europe 
and the United States to undermine women’s rights to 
reproductive autonomy by priori tising the rights of ideologically 
motivated service providers to freedom of conscience. 
Increasingly,  this occurs not only at the level of decision -making 
of individual health professionals,  but also at  higher levels of 
professional and state policy. We argue that some of the rights 
to freedom of conscience asserted by health care providers 2 are 
excessive in liberal  societies , incompatible with liberal no rms 
                                                 
1 Whi le  o ther  a reas o f medical  pract ice raise simi lar ly complex i ssues  
rela t ing to  conscient ious  object ion,  par t icular ly physician assisted suicide , 
we  focus on services  which promote reproduct ive autonomy in  this  paper .  
This i s  because,  whi le  there are simi lar i t ies between the two cases,  they 
are suff ic ient ly di fferent  that  an adequate discussion of each case would 
not  be poss ible in a  paper  o f this  length.  Ho wever ,  some of the issues 
discussed  in  this  paper  may be relevant  to  d iscuss ions  o f phys ician assisted 
suicide  for  example.   
2 In this paper ,  instead  of ‘doctor ’ ,  ‘pa tient ’  etc . ,  we  use the terms 
‘provider ’  and ‘cl ient ’  to  re fer  to  the  persons par t ic ipa ting in the p rovisio n 
of  contested  heal th care  services and those who use them,  respect ive ly.  
This i s  to  cap ture health professio nals and rec ipients o f services outside  
the doctor -pa tient -rela t ionship.  
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of pluralism and personal freedom, and impose unjustifiable 
costs on both individual persons, and society as a whole.   
To make this argument we first  consider the general claims in 
favour of the conflicting rights to freedom of conscience and 
reproductive autonomy. 3 Second, we examine two examples in 
the debate surrounding the conflict between these two competing 
rights claims. Our goal is to draw out the specific claims and 
counter-claims surrounding the two categories of right as they 
are applied in the policy context.  In doing so, we examine the 
claims made by advocates for strong rights to conscientious 
objection and freedom of conscience in specific health care 
policy contexts.  We argue that  demands of the type made by 
conscientious objectors in the  given examples are unreasonably 
broad, and would allow objecting health care providers to 
prevent other persons from enjoying their rights to reproductive 
autonomy, and to basic health care services.   Consequently,  the 
demands made by these objectors cannot be justified by appeal 
to liberal presumptions in favor of personal freedom. In closing, 
we argue that the trend towards eve r-greater concessions to 
freedom of conscience in healthcare policy settings must be 
resisted in order to preserve other important rights.  
                                                 
3 These r ights confl ict  in  this case;  no t  in genera l .  
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2.  Arguments in favour of rights to conscientious 
objection 
The following account is  intended to provide a d escriptive 
(rather than logical or normative ) overview of contexts in which 
the right to conscientious objection is generally exercised:  
1.  A duty to X is owed by all persons in group Y  
2.  Either the duty itself, or its likely consequences are 
deemed immoral by some members of Y 
3.  Some members of Y will  assert  a conscientious objection 
to X, and will request an exemption from the duty to X  
4.  An exemption will be granted (or not) to some or all  of 
those who objected, with or without conditions attached.  
The right to exempt oneself from the fulfilment of a generally 
held duty is typically justified on the grounds that such a right 
is vital for the preservation of freedom of conscience. The latter  
is itself argued to be a core value of pluralist, l iberal -democratic 
states,4 and ‘a moral right’. 5 Further,  the rights to freedom of 
                                                 
4 R.S.  Dresser .  ‘Freedom of  Conscience,  Professional  Responsib il i ty,  and  
Access to  Abor tion’ .  J Law Med Eth ics  1994;  22 :  280 -285:  280 .  
5 E.D. Pe llegr ino.  ‘The Physic ian’s Conscience ,  Consc ience Clauses,  and 
Religious Bel ie f :  A Cathol ic  Perspect ive’.  Fordham Urban Law J 2002; 
30:  221 -244: 226 ,  239.  
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conscience and conscientious  objection are argued to be 
constitutive of liberty and autonomy, 6 and to be necessary for 
the preservation of individual moral integrity. 7 In promoting 
these goods, the rights are argued to be vital  for the adequate 
toleration of different moral and philosophical  perspectives in a 
pluralistic society. 8  
Correlatively,  failure to adequately protect  freedom of 
conscience is argued to impose a particular view of the good on 
those who hold minority moral principles.  This is  argued to 
unjustifiably infringe upon the personal liberties of those with 
uncommon ethical perspectives and restrict their abil ity to live 
free lives. On this argument, denying rights to conscientious 
objection restricts personal liberty and autonomy. Each of these 
                                                 
6 E. Ceva & S.  Mora tt i .  ‘Whose  Sel f -Determinat ion?  Barr iers to  Access  to  
Emergency Hor monal Contracept ion in  I taly’ .  Kennedy Ins t  E thics  J  2013; 
23:  139 -167: 139 .  
7 M.R.  Wicclair .  ‘Conscientious  Objec tion in  Medicine’.  Bioethics  2000;  
14:  205 -227.  
8 D.P.  Sulmasy.  ‘What  i s  Consc ience and why is  Respect  for  i t  so 
Impor tant?’.  Theor Med Bioe th  2008; 29 :  135 -149: 146; A.  Giubi l ini .  ‘The 
Paradox of  Conscient ious Objec tion and  the Anemic Concept o f  
'Consc ience ' :  Do wnplaying the Role o f Moral  Integri ty in Health Care’ .  
Kennedy Inst  Eth ics  J  2014; 24:  159 -185: 163.  
6 
 
consequences are claimed to be considerable harms, which 
weigh in favor of guaranteeing rights to conscientious objection.  
Guaranteeing rights to conscientious objection is therefore seen 
as a means to protect  important personal freedoms, ensure state 
neutrality amongst alternative, incommensurable moral values, 
and to avoid the imposition of major harms on  people with 
uncommon moral or philosophical  perspectives .  On this view, 
being able to conscientiously object  to duties one finds 
objectionable enables right holders to hold minority moral 
beliefs,  pursue their personal life goals in accordance with such 
beliefs, and enjoy status as equal and autonomous members of  
society.   
3.  Arguments in Favour of Guaranteed Rights to 
Contraception 
There are two key factors which feature prominently in 
arguments in favour of rights to contraception; first, there are 
significant health benefits associated with access to 
contraception. For example, oral contraceptives can reduce the 
risk of some forms of cancer and can also treat ‘ menstrual 
disorders, acne or hirsutism, and pelvic pain’ .9 Further, women 
                                                 
9 Co mmittee on Preventat ive Services  for  Women (CPSW),  Inst i tute  o f  
Medicine  (IOM).  2011.  Clinical  Prevent ive  Services  for  Women: Closing 
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with certain medical conditions  can face additional health risks 
which may contraindicate pregnancy, while pregnancy and birth 
can carry long-term health risks to women.10 
Second, access to contraception, and the control over fertili ty 
that  it  provides,  is  a key factor in the promotion of women’s  
autonomy. 11 This is particularly important given that 
‘[p]regnancy and birth are not minor inconveniences…They 
constitute a major life event, which even when welcome causes 
immense discomfort  and disruption to many women’. 12 Being 
able to decide whether to become pregnant enables women to 
control if  and when the health,  social  and economic costs of 
pregnancy and parenthood are incurred and to avoid them when 
appropriate. 13 Therefore, access to contraception allows women 
                                                 
the Gaps .  Washington DC: The Inst i tute  o f Medicine  of The National  
Academies.  
10 Ibid:  103 -4;  A.  Sonfield ,  e t  a l .  2013.  The Socia l  and Economic Benef i t s  
of Women’s Abi l i ty  to  Determine Whether and  When  To  Have Chi ldren .  
New York,  USA: The  Gut tmacher  Ins t i tute .  
11 J .J .  Thomson.  ‘A Defense of Abor t ion’ .  Phi los  Public  Aff  1971; 1:  47 -
66.  
12 B. Hewson.  ‘Reproduct ive Autonomy and the Ethics o f Abort ion’.  J Med 
Ethics 2001; 27 :  i i10 -i i14:  i i10.  
13 L.P.  Freedman & S.L.  I saacs.  ‘Human Rights and Reproduct ive Choice’.  
Stud Fam Plann  1993; 24:  18 -30: 19 ;  D.  Tjet jens Meyers.  ‘The Rush to  
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to live a full  life in accordance with their personal l ife plans .14 
The right to reproductive autonomy is also argued to be justified 
because of its role in enabling people to be ‘self determining.. .a 
central  condition of personhood’. 15 
4.  Freedom of Conscience Vs. Reproductive Autonomy  
Each of these two rights are claimed by their advocates to be 
vital  to the interests of al l persons. A guaranteed right to 
freedom of conscience protects the ability to think and believe 
what one likes, and to live according to moral principles which 
one endorses in accordance with a self-selected life plan. 
Similarly, the right to reproductive autonomy also enables right 
holders to l ive according to their own view of the good, pursue 
                                                 
Motherhood: Pronatal is t  Discourse and Women's  Autonomy’.  Signs 2001; 
26:  735 -773: 736 .  
14 C.  Goldin & L.F.  Katz.  ‘The Power o f  the  Pil l :  Oral  Contracep tives  and  
Women’s Career  and Marr iage Decisions’.  J Poli t  Econ  2002; 110: 730 -
770: 731; O.  O 'Neil l .  2002.  Autonomy and  Trust  in  Bioeth ics .  Cambr idge:  
Cambr idge  Universi ty P ress:  52;  E.O.  Ananat  & D.M. Hungerman.  ‘The  
Power of the Pil l  for  the  Next Genera tion:  Ora l  Contracep tion 's  Effec ts on 
Fer t i l i ty,  Abor t ion,  and Maternal  & Child  Character is t ics’.  Rev Econ Stat  
2012; 94 :  37 -51 .  
15 A.  Buchanan,  e t  a l .  2002.  From Chance to  Choice:  Genet ics and Justice .  
Cambr idge:  Cambr idge Univers i ty Press:  216  
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their personal goals,  and perhaps most importantly,  control  what 
happens to their bodies. Each of these rights is therefore argued 
to be vital for the attainment of the same goal –  the preservation 
of personal liberty.  Each right is certainly important, and it is 
therefore necessary to ensure that in making public policy we 
remain aware of the ways in which the promotion of each right 
is said to infringe upon the promotion of the other.  
In the sections that follow, we discuss examples where the rights 
to freedom of conscience and to bodily integrity  and 
reproductive autonomy conflict , and examine claims made by 
advocates of wide reaching rights to conscientious objection in 
the context of contraceptive and reproductive services. The kind 
of broadly applicable right  asserted by health care providers  has 
been defined by Lafollete and Lafollete as ‘unqualified’ ,  
meaning that right holders are claimed to be entitled to 
conscientiously object ‘without having to give any account of 
her views and without having to do anything in lieu of 
discharging her professional duties’ .16 LaFollete and LaFollete 
cri ticise the extent of these claimed rights,  and note that  in other 
contexts objectors are obliged to fulfil compensatory duties in 
                                                 
16 E. LaFollet te  & H. LaFolle t te .  ‘Pr iva te Conscience,  Public  Acts’.  J Med 
Ethics 2007; 33 :  249 -254: 251.  
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order to be granted exemptions to duties to which they object .17 
Like LaFollete and LaFollete, we reject the ‘unqualified’ status 
of rights of conscientious objection in the context of health care 
provision for the reasons we set  out below.  
5. Example One: Health Care Professionals and 
Conscientious Objection  
Health care workers, including physicians,  midwives,  nurses,  
and pharmacists have frequently asserted rights to exempt 
themselves from duties which would oblige them to participate 
in the provision of contraceptive and abortion services. These 
claims are often supported with referenc e to the supposedly 
serious harms associated with denials of freedom of conscience 
such as losing a job. In 2014, for example, a physician and 
hospital  director in Poland was fired when he refused to admit a 
woman to the hospital he managed for an abortion, and failed to 
refer her to another hospital . 18 Pellegrino further argues that 
denying physicians a right to exempt themselves from 
participating in abortion or contraception servi ces risks 
excluding members of certain groups from access to the medical 
professions –  a major violation of their rights to personal 
                                                 
17 Ibid:  250 .  
18 Reuters.  2014.  ‘Po lish Doctor  fired  for  Refusing to  Al low Woman to  
Have Abort ion’.  The Ir i sh Times.  10 July .  
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freedom.19 In many cases, such harms are held to justify refusal 
to fulfil l  otherwise mandatory duties, even where those dut ies 
are fundamental to the professional role of objectors .   
To i llustrate, many pharmacists have asserted rights to 
conscientiously object to the provision of medicines they deem 
objectionable, 20 including the contraceptive pill 21 and 
‘emergency hormonal contraception’ (EHC). 22 While such 
asserted rights are not always respected, in many jurisdictions,  
such rights are enshrined in law .23 Physicians and nurses have 
                                                 
19 Pellegr ino,  op .  c i t .  no te  5 ,  p .226,  239.  
20 L.A. Davidson,  et  a l .  ‘Religion and Conscientious Objec tion:  A Survey 
of  Pharmacists ’  Will ingness to  Dispense Medica tions’.  Soc Sci  Med 2010; 
71:  161 -165: 161 -162.  
21 M.K.  Coll ins.  ‘Consc ience Clauses and  Oral  Contracep tives :  
Conscient ious Objec tion or  Cal culated Obstruction’ .  Annals Health  L  
2006; 15 :  37 -60 :  37 -38 ;  Giub il ini ,  op.  ci t .  note  8 ,  p .173;  M. Rohde.  2008 .  
'Rebuke Upheld in Refusa l  to  Fi l l  Bir th Control ' .  Milwaukee Wisconsin 
Journal Sen tina l  26 March .  
22 C.T .  Gallagher ,  e t  a l .  ‘The  Fox and the Grapes:  An Anglo -I r i sh 
Perspective on Conscient ious Object ion to  the Supply of Emergency 
Hormonal Contracept ion wi thout Prescr ip t ion’.  J  Med Eth ics  2013;  39:  
638-642: 638.  
23 The Guttmacher  Ins t i tute .  2015.  State Pol ic ies in  Brie f:  Refusing  to 
Provide Health  Services.  New York,  NY:  The Guttmacher  Ins t i tute .  
Avai lab le at :  ht tp: / /www.gut tmacher .org/s ta tecenter /sp ibs/spib_RPHS.pdf  
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also been granted similar  legal rights,  which are even more 
widely protected,  with regard to participation in abortion or 
physician assisted suicide. 24 Recently in Sweden, the new leader 
of the Christian Democrats political party stated that she would 
campaign for the introduction of a law guaranteeing a right to 
conscientious objection for health care workers. 25 
The right to conscientious objection has also been asserted when 
only indirect participation in a contested service is required. For 
example,  two midwives in the United Kingdom recently sued 
(unsuccessfully) for a right to conscientiously object to the 
performance of services which were indirectly involved in the 
                                                 
[Accessed  1st  Sep tember  2015] .  National  Women’s  Law Center .  2015.  
Pharmacy Refusals 101.  Washington D.C.:  Nat ional  Women’s Law Center .  
Avai lab le a t :  h t tp: / /www.nwlc .org/resource/pharmacy -refusa ls -101  
[Accesssed 1s t  September  2015] .  
24 Dresser ,  op.  c i t .  no te 4 ,  p .  282–283; Pellegr ino ,  op.  ci t .  no te 5 ,  p .222;  
D.P.  Flynn.  ‘Pharmacis t  Conscience Clauses and Access to  Oral  
Contracep tives’.  J Med Ethics  2008; 34 :  517-520: 517.  We discuss this  
point  in more  detai l  be low.  
25 S.  Rogberg.  2015.  ‘Ebba Busch Thor :  Vårdpersonal  ska få  neka ut föra  
aborter ’ .  Aftonbladet  4  May ;  C.  Munthe .  Philosophical  Comment [ Interne t]  
Gothenburg:  Chr ist ian Munthe.  1  May 2015  –  [ci ted 2015 May 9] .  ‘Five  
Observa tions About Consc ient ious Object ion in Health  Care’ .  Avai lable  
from ;  ht tp: / /philosophica lcomment .blogspot.de /2015/05 / five -
observations -about -conscientious.html .  
13 
 
provision of abortions. They were asked to ‘answer telephone 
calls to book women in for care, and delegate to or supervise 
staff providing that care to women’.26 Despite the indirectness 
of this involvement,  the two midwives argued that they should 
have a right to conscientiously object to these duties. They did 
not object  to answering phone calls or doing administrative 
paperwork as such, yet by their definition of complicity they 
were as morally involved in an action they believed was 
objectionable as if  they were personally required to perform 
abortions.27   
In many instances,  the right to conscientiously object to 
professional duties is argued to be contingent upon two main 
factors; first , that the objecting professional refers their client 
to an alternative provider. 28 Second, that  accessing such 
alternative provision does not impose significant additional 
                                                 
26 Royal College of  Midwives.  2014.  ‘Landmark Supreme Court  
Judgement’.  
27 Ibid;  R.  Alta  Charo.  ‘The Celes t ial  Fire  o f Consc ience —  Refusing to  
Del iver  Medica l  Care’.  N Engl J  Med 2005; 352: 2471 -2473:2471;  
J .D.  Cantor .  ‘Conscient ious  Objec tion Gone Awry —  Restor ing Sel f less 
Professional ism in Medicine’.  N Engl  J  Med 2009; 360:  1484-1485:1484.   
28 C.  Del Bò.  ‘Conscientious Object ion and  the  Morning -After  P il l ’ .  J  Appl  
Philos   2012; 29:  133 -145; Gallagher  et  a l . ,  op.  ci t .  note  22.  
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costs on clients. 29 Where these conditions are met, i t  is  argued 
that  both objecting providers and their clients achieve their 
desired outcomes. Clients are able to access the contested 
services,  while providers are able to avoid participating (at least 
as closely) in actions which they believe to be i mmoral.  Notably 
however, this solution is disputed, with some advocates for the 
rights of conscientious objectors claiming that such a duty would 
still  violate their right to freedom of conscience. 30 
These examples all focus on the rights asserted by indivi dual 
persons to refuse to fulfil  professional duties which they feel  are 
prohibited by their religious beliefs.  In the following section we 
examine a recent example which has significantly extended the 
boundaries of the category of agents to who m rights to 
conscientious objection must be granted .  
                                                 
29 H. Brody & S.S.  Night .  ‘The Pharmacis t 's  Personal  and Profess ional  
Integri ty’ .  Am J Bioeth  2007; 7:  16-17 .  
30 R. Ste in.  2005.  ‘Pharmacis ts '  Rights at  Front  Of New Debate’.  The  
Washing ton Post  28 March ;  R.  Dresser .  ‘Professionals,  Conformi ty,  and 
Consc ience’ .  Hastings  Cent Rep  2005; 35 :  9 -10 :  9 .  
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5.  Example Two: Corporate Conscientious Objection 31 
Recently,  the owners of three privately owned, for-profit 
corporations 32 claimed in a case tried before the Supreme Court 
of the United States (SCOTUS) that  obliging them to cover the 
cost  of certain contraceptives through their insurance schemes 
violated their right to freedom of conscience. 33 This objection 
by Hobby Lobby et al. was based on the claim that the contested 
services were immoral since, according to their beliefs, they 
                                                 
31 I t  should be no ted tha t  ne ither  o f the authors are Lawyers .  Our ana lys is 
of this  case serves to  i l lustrate  the normative arguments brought forward 
to  support  or  re fute an impor tant  t rend in heal th policy we want  to  cr i t ic i se .  
I t  is  der ived  from a  phi losophica l ,  normative perspect ive  which may not  
account  for  some  of  the f iner  lega l  intr icacies surrounding i t .  For  analys i s 
of  the lega l  arguments and  history of  the Hobby Lobby case,  see E.  Sepper .  
‘Contracept ion and the Bir th o f Corporate Conscience’.  Am U J Gender ,  
Soc Pol 'y  & Law 2014;  22:  303 -342.  
32 Burwel l  v.  Hobby Lobby Stores ,  Inc,  134 S.  Ct .  2751 (2014)  (Nos.  13 -
354,  13 -356) .  For  the  purposes  o f brevi ty,  we sha ll  re fer  to  the  three 
corporat ions and the ir  owners co llect ive ly as ‘Hobby Lobby et  al . ’ .  The  
objections raised  by Conestoga Wood Special t ies  Limi ted re fer  to  fewer  
contracept ive services than those of Hobby Lobby or  Mardel ,  but  each 
corporat ion makes  s imi lar  enough c la ims that  they can be  aggregated  for  
the purposes o f this paper .  
33 Hobby Lobby Stores,  e t  a l .  2012.  Compla int :  Case  5:12 -cv-01000-HE.  
Oklaho ma:  United States  Dis tr ict  Court  For  the Western Distr ic t  o f  
Oklaho ma; Supreme Court  o f the United Sta tes,  op.  ci t .  note 32 ,  p .4 .  
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caused abortions, which the plaintiffs believe to be a sin. 34 
Consequently,  contributing to the cost of providing such 
services would make Hobby Lobby et al .  complicit in immoral 
behavior. Being forced to continue providing funding for these 
services would thus represent an unjustifiable infringement on 
the plaintiff’s right to freedom of conscience. Therefore,  they 
argued to be allowed an exemption to the requirement in order 
to avoid incurring significant harm. 35  
                                                 
34 Supreme Court  o f  the Uni ted States,  op .  c i t .  note 32 ,  p .2 .  In  this way,  
the c la ims made by Hobby Lobby e t  a l .  echo  ear l ier  c la ims made by several  
rel igious,  non-profi t  employers who demanded ,  and rece ived,  a  r ight  to  be 
exempt  from the requirement  to  contr ibute  to  the  cost  o f  services  which 
confl ict  wi th their  values ,  P .  West -Oram.  ‘Freedom of Conscience  and 
Health Care in the United States o f  America:  the  Confl ic t  Between Publ ic  
Health  and  Religious  Liber ty in  the Pa tient  Protect ion and Affordab le  Care 
Act’ .  Heal th  Care  Anal  2013; 21:  237 -247 .  
35 The  asser t ion that  the  contested  services  cause  abort ions  i s  disputed by  
medical  evidence.  Medical  consensus on the four  contested services i s  tha t  
they are non-abort ive,  and per form the ir  contraceptive function pr imar i ly  
by prevent ing ovulat ion or  inhib it ing fer t i l iza t ion ,  I .  Sivin.  ‘IUDs are 
Contracep tives,  Not Abort i facients:  A Co mment on Research and Belie f’.  
Stud Fam Plann  1989; 20:  355 -359; ‘Long -Acting Reversib le  
Contracep tion (LARC):  IUD and Implant ’.  The American  College of  
Obste tr ic ians  and Gynecolog is ts  2014.  Ho wever ,  we proceed  in  our  
argument  as though this empir ica l  c laim was cor rect .  
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The Supreme Court ruled in a  close majority on 30 June 2014 
that  the requirements of the ACA did violate the rights of the 
owners of Hobby Lobby et  al. to freedom of conscience. 36 
Consequently,  Hobby Lobby et al . were granted an exemption to 
the requirement to cover the cost of insuri ng the disputed 
services.  However,  in order to preserve the rights of women to 
access the services,  the Supreme Court  stated that insurance 
companies,  instead of employers,  should be required to take on 
the cost of providing the contested contraceptive ser vices.37  
6.  Against Unqualified Rights to Conscientious Objection  
In the rest  of this paper we argue that  both in the individual and 
the corporate cases discussed, unqualified rights to 
conscientious objection of the kind described are incompatible 
                                                 
36 Supreme Court  o f the Uni ted States,  op.  ci t .  note 32,  p .4 .  
37 Ibid :  pp.9 -10.  The  Court  found  that  the government  had  a compell ing 
interes t  in ensur ing tha t  wo men enjoy access  to  the  c ontested  contracept ive  
services.  Ho wever ,  rather  than requir ing compl iance wi th the  ACA,  i t  held 
that  a  less res tr ict ive means to  ensuring access would be to  extend an 
exist ing concess ion,  previously granted  to  rel igious non -profi t  employers,  
so  tha t  i t  a l so app lied  to  closely held,  for -prof i t  corporat ions.  For  a  
discuss ion of  the  i ssues  wi th  this approach see  West -Oram,  op.  ci t .  note 
34.  
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with the l iberal, pluralist paradigm. 38 We also reject the claim 
that  rights to conscientious objection prevent state intrusion into 
the private sphere of personal moral beliefs. Instead, we argue 
that  in granting rights to be exempt from otherwise applicable 
duties,  States allow ideological objectors to impose additional 
duties on other persons,  and expand their own view of the good 
into the public arena, thereby restricting the freedoms of other 
persons to live according to their own view of the good.    
Complicity  
First,  the arguments for a right to conscientious objection in the 
above examples rely upon an unreasonably broad definition of 
complicity.  The breadth of this definition results in the 
ascription of responsibility for wrongful actions to an 
implausibly large number of persons, only tangentially involved 
in actions they find objectionable. 39 As Del Bò argues in the 
context of pharmacist refusals to dispense the ‘emergency 
contraception pill’  (ECP), 40 ‘ the mere act  of selling ECP to a 
woman who asks for it  ce rtainly does not ipso facto prevent 
                                                 
38 For  the purposes o f argument we presuppose the val idi ty and legi t imacy 
of such a paradigm.  
39 Cantor ,  op .  ci t .  no te 27 ,  p .1484.  
40 Del  Bò,  op.  ci t .  note 28 ,  p .133.  
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anything, and therefore certainly does not cause an abortion’ .41 
Correlatively, midwives who are obliged to provide 
administrative support to an hospital  department which provides 
abortions, and the corporations discussed in section five,  are 
even further removed from the contested behaviour, in that their 
responsibili ties extend only so far as enabling other parties to 
potentially provide contested services to clients who have legal 
entit lements to them .42  
It  is also worth noting that employer provided health insurance 
is generally seen as merely one part  of the remune ration package 
provided to employees,  in addition to  a salary. 43 Consequently,  
in order to be consistent to their opposition to the use of ‘their’ 
funds for contested contraceptive services, objecting employers 
such as Hobby Lobby et al. would have to also object to 
providing their employees with a salary. This is because, in each 
case the financial  transfer from employer to employee could 
                                                 
41 Ibid:  139 .  
42 Of  course,  in  the case  o f par t icipat ion in the  ac tua l  per formance of  
abort ions,  the involvement i s  much more d irec t ,  though we address this 
below.   
43 J .  Curr ie  & B.C.  Madrian.  ‘Heal th,  Heal th Insurance and the  Labor  
Market ’.  Handbook of  Labor Economics 1999; 3 :  3309 -3416: 3368–3376; 
G.A.  Jensen & M.A.  Morrisey.  ‘Employer ‐Sponsored Heal th Insurance and 
Mandated Benefi t  Laws’ .  Milbank  Q 1999; 77:  425-459: 439.  
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enable the latter to perform an action to which the former 
objects.44 
In the above examples ,  the link between objector and contested 
service is tenuous, and involves numerous causal steps. With 
regard to objecting individuals, it  has been stated that if  
complicity is taken to adhere so far down a causal chain, all  
persons would be entitled to exempt themselves from  any  duty 
which they felt  required them to violate their conscience, 
without having to explain that  belief, or offer any compensatory 
action in reciprocation for the exemption. 45 Such a broad 
interpretation of freedom of conscience, and a commitment to 
protecting it so extensively would, it  is argued, lead to ‘anarchy’  
in the provision of medical care .46 That is , if  physicians could 
and would conscientiously object to examining an d treating 
members of identifiable groups 47 on ideological  grounds this 
                                                 
44 R.  Alta Charo.  ‘The Supreme Court  Decis ion in  the Hobby Lobby Case :  
Consc ience ,  Complici ty,  and Contracept ion’.  JAMA in tern med  2014;  174: 
1537-1538; Sepper  op .  c i t .  note 31,  p .321 -322.  
45 LaFollet te  & LaFol le t te ,  op.  ci t .  no te 16,  p .251.  
46 N.  Eyal  & A. Gosser ies .  ‘Obamacare and Conscientious Object ion:  Some 
Introductory Thoughts’ .  Ethical  Perspect  2013; 20:  109 -117: 114 .  
47 For  example ,  Savulescu suggests that  a  physic ian might re fuse to  trea t  
the elder ly on the grounds tha t  they have had a ‘ fa ir  inni ngs’ J .  Savulescu.  
‘Consc ient ious Object ion in Medicine’.  Br Med J  2006; 332: 294 -297: 188.  
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would either endanger patients on a regular basis, 48 or require 
major,  costly restructuring of medical  provision. 49  
Granting health care providers broad rights to conscientious  
objection would make health care services extremely unreliable,  
and subject to the ideological commitments of provider s,  rather 
than the medical  needs of patients.  Of course,  certain kinds of 
discrimination of this kind would be prohibited by the UK 
Equality Act .50 However, the existence of this legislation 
supports our claim in this paper,  that the ideological  
commitments of health care providers should not be allowed to 
dictate what care is available to their patients. 51 
Del Bò argues that in order for an exemption to be justified,  the 
otherwise mandatory action must ‘directly [bring] about a state 
                                                 
Similar ly,  Brock d iscusses cases  where pharmacis ts  have re fused to 
dispense emergency contracept ion ‘ because  they object  to  par t icular  kinds 
of customers  us ing the  prescr ibed i tem, such as  unmarr ied  couples  or  
minors ’  D.W. Brock.  ‘Conscient ious Refusa l  by Physicians and  
Pharmacis ts :  Who is  Obliga ted to  do  What ,  and  Why?’ .  Theor Med Bioe th  
2008; 29:  187 -200: 191.   
48 Ibid:  p .188.   
49 Cantor ,  op .  ci t .  no te 27 ,  p .1484.  
50 The Equali ty  Act ,  2010,  c .  15 (UK).  
51 We are gra teful  to  one  of the  anonymous peer  reviewers for  highlighting 
this point  to  us.  
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of affairs contrary to the convictions of that agent; it  is  not 
enough that the agent merely enables or encourages that state of 
affairs’ .52 Endorsing Del Bò’s  standard for meaningful 
complicity would therefore limit the number of cases in which a 
right to conscientious objection could be accepted. Doing so 
would allow states to consistently protect the right to freedom 
of conscience, while avoiding the ‘anarchy  problem’ discussed 
above.53  
The anarchy scenario is even more problematic in corporate 
conscientious objection. If companies –  societal  actors with an 
incomparably wider reach than individuals –  could exempt 
themselves on grounds of tenuous complicity fro m contributing 
to the provision of contested services,  society as a whole could 
be forced to absorb escalating, and unsustainable,  costs in order 
to ensure the continuity of central  infrastructure and vital 
services.  If  taken too far, this could result  in important services 
being denied to much, if not all ,  of society  
                                                 
52 Del  Bò,  op.  ci t .  note 28 ,  p .139.  
53 Eyal  & Gosser ies,  op .  ci t .  no te 46,  p .114.  This def ini t ion would a lso 
extend  r ights to  conscient iously objec t  to  heal th  care profess ionals  who 
may be required to  per form abor t ions.  However ,  as we d iscuss belo w, other  
reasons mot ivate reject ing the r ight  to  consc ientious objec tion in such 
cases.  
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Voluntariness  
Second, it  has been argued that  rights to conscientiously object  
are already extended to wartime objectors, and that such cases 
are analogous to objections raised by non -military conscientious 
objectors because the objecting parties in both cases object to 
the kill ing of other persons (or those they define as persons in 
the case of health care providers). However, comparing the two 
cases is to assert  a false equivalency between th em. Notably,  
participation in a profession which entails some objectionable 
duties is  voluntary, while mili tary conscription is not. 54 Nobody 
has to  become a physician, nurse, midwife, or pharmacist,  but 
having done so they have professional duties which th ey can 
reasonably be expected to fulfil ,  even if they assert  a strong 
moral objection to those duties. 55  
                                                 
54 J .P .  Kel leher .  ‘Emergency Contracep tion and  C onsc ient ious Object ion’.  
J Appl Philos 2010; 27 :  290-304: 301; LaFolle t te  & LaFolle t te ,  op.  c i t .  
note 16,  p .250.  
55 R. Rhodes.  ‘The Prior i ty o f Professional  E thics Over  Personal  Mora li ty’ .  
Br Med J 2006; 332; U.  Schüklenk.  Udo Schuklenk' s  Ethx Blog  [ Interne t]  
Kingston:  Udo Schüklenk 26 March 2015 –  [c i ted 2015 Apr il  26] .  
‘Consc ient ious Objec tion in Medic ine :  Pr iva te  Ideologica l  Convict ions  
Must  Not  Supersede  Publ ic  Service Obl iga tions’.  Available  from; 
ht tp: / /ethxblog.blogspot .de/2015/03 /consc ientious -object ion- in-
medic ine.html .  
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Similarly,  Hobby Lobby et al. have incurred their obligation to 
provide coverage at least partly voluntarily. Provisions within 
the ACA would have allowed Hobby Lobby et al . to retain their 
existing employee health insurance plan as long as no changes 
were made to it after the date of the ACA’s enactment, March 
23 rd  2010.56 This ‘grandfather’ clause would have allowed 
Hobby Lobby et al .  to ‘indefinitely avoid the contraceptive 
coverage requirement by not making certain changes after the 
ACA’s effective date’. 57 While this would have imposed costs on 
Hobby Lobby et  al.  in terms of reduced flexibility in their future 
insurance provision, such costs are not un reasonable, given the 
extent of the concessions that they demand from society as a 
whole (to be exempted from a generally applicable law, and to 
have other persons incur additional costs to compensate for their 
exemption).  
Private and public spheres  
                                                 
56 Compila t ion of Pa tient  Protect ion and Affordable Care Act:  Includ ing 
Patient  Protec tion and Affordable  Care  Act  Heal th -Rela ted Por t ions o f  the 
Health Care and Educat ion Reconcil iat ion Act o f  2010,  Pub .  L.  No.  111-148 
(May 1, 2010): sec.  1251.  
57 P .D.  Clement,  e t  a l .  On Writ  o f Cer t iorar i  to  the Uni ted Sta tes Court  o f  
Appeals  for  the Tenth Circui t :  Brie f  for  Respondents.  2010.  
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The concessions granted to objecting providers of important 
health care goods and services do not represent mere protection 
of the private sphere from unwarranted public intrusion. Instead, 
they expand the boundaries of the private sphere of freedom of 
conscience into the public arena, with two distinct  and important 
consequences.  Firstly,  conscientiously objecting to the 
fulfilment of certain professional,  legal,  or moral duties can 
impose significant burdens on third parties, and can obstruct the 
enjoyment of other important rights. 58  
In the case of health care professionals,  non -objecting medical  
professionals may feel obliged to take on extra responsibili ties 
in order to make up for the shortfall in provision caused by their 
objecting colleagues’ intransigence  and ensure that the rights of 
women who want contraception are fulfil led. 59 Similarly,  in the 
case of objecting corporations, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Burwell vs. Hobby Lobby et al.  imposes additional duties on the 
State and individual duty bearers,  such as insurance companies, 
to restructure social infrastructure to accommodate the 
concessions granted to Hobby Lobby et  al. and to ensure the 
                                                 
58 Del  Bò,  op.  c i t .  note 28,  p .139;  Dresser ,  op.  ci t .  no te 4 ,  p .281; R.A.  
Lindsay.  ‘When to  Grant  Conscient iou s  Objec tor  Sta tus’.  Am J Bioe th 
2007; 7:  25 -26 :  26.  
59 Del  Bò,  op.  ci t .  note 28 ,  p .139; Dresser ,  op .  c i t .  no te 4 ,  p .281  
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accessibility of contested medical  services for when employers 
raise conscience objections. 60  
More importantly,  the right to conscientious objection granted 
to objecting providers in the cases mentioned does not merely 
preserve their right to hold particular beliefs and live according 
to them; it allows them to actively deny that  women enjoy the 
same right. The decision to use contraception is personal and 
private,  and based in part  on the beliefs held by any given 
individual. Both opponents and advocates of contraception hold 
a right to make the decision to use contraception based on their 
personal beliefs. Consequently,  ideological objectors ‘are not 
required to use contraceptives and are free to advocate against 
their use’.61 However,  the breadth of the right to conscientious 
objection demanded in the above examples  allows objectors to 
deny, via exempting themselves from their professional or legal 
duties,  that women also enjoy a similar right. 62  
                                                 
60 HRSA.gov [Internet] .  Washington D.C. :  U.S.  Depar tment o f  Health  and  
Human Services;  2013 [ci ted 2014 October  22] .  Avai lable from:  
ht tp: / /hrsa.gov/womensguidel ines/  
61 Al ta  Charo ,  op.  ci t .  note 44 ,  p .1537.  
62 Burwel l  v.  Hobby Lobby Stores ,  Inc,  134 S.  Ct .  2751 (2014)  (Nos.  13 -
354,  13-356)  op.  c i t .  note 32 ,  sec.  B -II .  
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Objecting providers in these cases are therefore not obliged to 
recognise or respect the rights of their female clients to basic 
health care, reproductive autonomy and the freedom to live their 
lives as they choose. When individual providers object  to a duty,  
it  is  in practice,  usually (but not always) possible for clients to 
gain access to contested services elsewhere. However, corporate 
entit ies, having far greater reach and power than individual 
health care professionals,  are able to impose wider, structural  
costs on society as a whole when they assert rights to 
conscientious objection. They do so by firstly exempting 
themselves from duties corresponding to many m ore rights to 
reproductive autonomy at  once than individual objectors are able 
(all female employees at all  times, rather than one female client 
at a specific time). In doing so, they impose far greater burdens 
on society as a whole than individual objecto rs. The costs 
imposed by the objections of individual providers are usually 
(but not always) isolated to client s,  and to non-objecting 
providers who eventually provide services.63 In contrast, the 
costs imposed by objectors l ike Hobby Lobby demand State level 
restructuring of law, and health care infrastructure in order to 
ensure the continued accessibility of contested services.  
                                                 
63 While  there  may be many instances o f  such costs,  they are not  sys temic ,  
and  are typica lly res tr ic ted to  smal l  groups of persons .  
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Corporate conscience rights do not therefore guarantee  the right 
to freedom of conscience , but rather entitle corporations to 
shape public policy according to their particular ideological  
preferences , and thus restrict  the public sphere in which others 
live.  
7.  Competing freedoms, competing harms: the dangers for 
public policy  
Our goal in this paper has been to argue that the concessions 
demanded by, and in many cases granted to,  ideologically 
motivated providers of essential health care services are 
unreasonable and unjustifiable.  This is because they could not 
be consistently granted to all persons, and because they deny the 
existence of important rights held by other people.  
Consequently,  we argued that these rights do not grant 
protections from excessive State interference, but instead allow 
objectors to dictate the terms of the social contract to their 
benefit. In doing so, we argued that  the claims presented by 
objectors are based on excessively broad definitions of 
complicity and of the protections entailed by the right to 
freedom of conscience.  Therefore, these concession s should be 
recognized as exceeding respect for freedom of conscience per 
se.  Instead, they represent a demand for special treatment which 
privileges an unreasonably broadly defined right to freedom of 
conscience over the rights of other persons.  
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This point can be made with reference to the classic injunction 
that  one’s freedom to swing one’s arms ends ‘where the other 
man’s nose begins’. 64 The claims made by objecting health care 
providers in the  noted examples are not pleas for a right to swing 
their fists without hitting anyone else’s nose. Instead, they are 
demanding a right to throw punches in a crowded room. That 
rights to conscientious objection are not always recognized, and 
are sometimes l imited by requirements to ensure alternative 
sources of provision, means that conscientious objectors have 
not (yet) landed a knockout blow against the right to 
reproductive autonomy.  
Further, the overall impact of guaranteeing rights to 
conscientious objection for health care professionals has been 
largely manageable. While there are instances where people are 
denied care, these are typically deviations from the norm , often 
caused by refusals of ideological objectors to comply with 
requirements designed to ensure continuity in the availability of 
care.  While harmful for the affected persons,  generally there are 
sufficient non-objecting health care providers available to 
                                                 
64 Z. Chafee.  ‘Freedom of  Speech in War  Time’.  Harv Law Rev 1919: 932 -
973: 957.  Supreme Cour t  Just ice Ruth Bader  Ginsburg re fer s to  this point  
in  her  dissenting opinion,  Burwel l  v.  Hobby Lobby Stores,  Inc,  134 S.  Ct .  
2751 (2014)  (Nos.  13 -354,  13-356)  op.  c i t .  note 32 ,  sec.  B -II .  
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ensure the continued accessibil ity of contested services. 65 
However,  with corporations now stepping into the ring, the game 
has changed significantly,  moving to higher and therefore 
broader policy levels.  
Previously,  exemptions to duties to provide reproductive health 
services were only extended to religious insti tutions,  such as 
churches.  Under the decision in Burwell  vs.  Hobby Lobby et  al.  
however,  closely-held, non-religious,  for-profit organizations,  
such as hospital operators or private Universities can in 
principle object to their legal obligations. Conscience objections 
by societal  actors such as these could affect  large numbers of 
people, and impose exponentially greater costs, in terms of new 
infrastructural , financial, and legislative obligations, than the 
objections of individual health care providers.  Therefore,  based 
on the recent developments described in this paper, it  is  
warranted to fear that the trend to demand rights to freedom of 
conscience could grow even further, into other areas of health 
care,  and indeed, social and welfare provision as a whole.  To 
                                                 
65 Brody & Night ,  op.  ci t .  note 29 ,  p .16.  However ,  as Dreweke  notes,  o ther  
legis lat ive  ac t ions,  such as  the imposit ion of  increased (and unnecessary) 
regula t ion of  abor t ion cl inics,  is  undermining the abil i ty o f wo men to  
access needed heal th care services J .  Dreweke.  ‘Contracep tion I s Not 
Abort ion:  The Strategic Campaign of  Antiabort ion Groups to  Persuade th e  
Publ ic  Otherwise’.  Guttmacher  Rep Public  Pol icy  2014; 17 :  14 -20.  
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date, the risks of this happening have not been adequately 
mapped. The Hobby Lobby decision changes what has until  now 
been a debate about the limits of conscience in individuals into 
one about the very nature of the social provision of important 
goods, and the extent of what we owe to each other in modern 
societies. We must,  therefore, engage with this debate,  and 
defend important freedoms from gradual erosion by seemingly 
reasonable concessions to unjustifiable demands.  
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